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ATTACKING THE AFFLUENT ISLANDS:
A LEGAL STRATEGY FOR THE 70's
SAMUEL C. JACKSON*
[Editor's Note: The legal strategies employed in the attack on racial
and economic exclusionary zoning, as set forth in Mr. Jackson's article,
are further examined in the succeeding article by Messrs. Aloi and
Goldberg.]
Within the past 25 years, almost as much land has been converted
to urban use in the United States as in the preceding 175 years of our
country's history. By the end of the 70's, surburban islands are ex-
pected to hold 50 per cent more people than the central cities.,
While millions of Americans have benefited from this pattern of
urban growth, thousands have not. These individuals have been
locked into our central cities which are rapidly becoming peninsulas
for the poor. With the rising cost of housing, more and more Middle
Americans will also be trapped on the fringes of these ghettos.
The problems which beset the residents of these peninsulas are
not limited to the housing arena. They are frequently victims of
arbitrary police practices, unethical tactics by private merchants, and
an inequitable distribution of financial aid to the public schools.
Moreover, they frequently fall prey to gerrymandering techniques
used to dilute the effectiveness of their ballots. In addition, because
of inadequate transportation, ghetto residents do not have access to
employment opportunities in the suburbs-opportunities which might
* Assistant Secretary for Metropolitan Planning and Development, United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
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enable them to join their former neighbors who have migrated to the
affluent islands of suburbia.
Why have so many of our citizens been marooned on these penin-
sulas and what strategy can be used to help them row to the affluent
islands? These are questions which confront us in the 70's.
One primary device has been used by suburban governments to
bar low and moderate-income families from the affluent islands: that
device is zoning. The terms "large lot zoning," "restrictive codes," and
"exclusionary zoning" have become catch phrases symbolizing the
problem.2
The forum for attacking the problem has been the courts'. One
of the first challenges to exclusionary zoning was Buchanan v. Warley.3
In Louisville, Kentucky, a black majority formula was used for segre-
gating residential areas. The Supreme Court invalidated the zoning
ordinance establishing this formula and said:
C]an a white man be denied, consistently with due process of
aw, the right to dispose of his property to a purchaser by pro-
hibiting the occupation of it for the sole reason that the purchaser
is a person of color intending to occupy the premises as a place
of residence?...
We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property
in question to a person of color was not a legitimate exercise
of the police power of the State, and is in direct violation of the
fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution preventing state interference with property rights
except by due process of law.4
While a modem court would have been concerned with the four-
teenth amendment rights of the buyer rather than those of the seller,
this decision is important as it serves to illustrate that discriminatory
zoning hurt not only the black or Puerto Rican-American who
wanted to move into a better neighborhood, but also the Polish-Amer-
ican or Italian-American who wanted to sell his home and move to
another neighborhood.
Despite the implications of zoning for civil rights groups, most of
the early attacks on exclusionary zoning were launched by developers
who wanted to build multiple family housing units in suburbia. These
developers were subject to constant frustration by regulations that
2. Brooks, Exclusionary Zoning (American Society of Planning Officials Rpt.
No. 254, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Brooks].
3. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
4. Id. at 78, 82.
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zoned large quantities of undeveloped land for large lots. The
most successful of these attacks occured in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. In the case of National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn,5
a four acre minimum lot requirement was held unconstitutional. The
court refused to accept the township's argument that the requirement
was necessary to prevent an unreasonable burden on the sewage dis-
posal and drainage systems and the local road network or to pre-
serve the "area's character." 6
In recent years a new legal strategy has emerged, based not on re-
strictions of a builder's right to the intensive development of land,
but on the broad social implications of exclusion. Mary Brooks in
"Exclusionary Zoning"' cites several reasons for the development of
the new strategy. First, organizations representing the poor and mi-
nority groups have become deeply concerned about the inability of
the poor, the black, and the Spanish-surnamed to obtain housing in
desirable locations. Second, the housing crisis has assumed alarming
proportions. The gap between the need for low and moderate-in-
come housing and the production of such housing is widening. Ac-
cess to suburban and outlying areas appears to be necessary to a viable
solution to the housing shortage. Third, from a legal standpoint
large-lot zoning cannot be attacked as the sole factor underlying dis-
criminatory land-use practices, as other factors are contributing ele-
ments in the exclusion of low-income and minority families from
residential areas.
The earliest case which reflects the new thrust in the battle against
exclusionary zoning is Raniel v. City of Lansing." In Ranjel the court
enjoined the holding of a referendum which could have reversed a
rezoning action taken by the Lansing, Michigan, City Council. The
council's action enabled the construction of a federally supported
low-income housing project in an all-white single-family neighbor-
hood. While there was no recognition of a constitutional right to
low-cost housing, the court ruled that discriminatory local tactics
could not be used to deprive individuals of the benefits of federal
programs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed
the lower court ruling,9 objecting to the district court's consideration
5. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
6. Id. at , 215 A.2d at 608-11.
7. Brooks, note 2 supra.
8. 293 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev'd, 417 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1969).
9. 417 F.2d 321 (1969).
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of the racial motivation of those who sought the referendum. The
court stated that "if the electors had a legal right to a referendum,
their motive in exercising that right would be immaterial."10 The
Supreme Court has been asked to review the appellate decision.
In two recent decisions, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
launched an attack on exclusionary zoning practices. The court, in
Kit-Mar Builders, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,"' ruled un-
constitutional a township ordinance limiting residential developments
to lots of no less than two or three acres. In discussing the role of the
local governing units of the Philadelphia suburb, the court declared:
"Neither Concord Township ... nor any other local governing unit
may retreat behind a cover of exclusive zoning."12
The battle against the establishment of islands for the affluent con-
tinued in Appeal of Girsh.13 In Girsh, the court held that it was un-
constitutional for a community not to provide for apartments in its
zoning ordinance. The rationale advanced in this case was that a com-
munity cannot use zoning to avoid its responsibility to provide a
reasonable share of housing for families with low and moderate in-
comes who cannot afford single-family housing. The court asserted:
Perhaps in an ideal world, planning and zoning would be done
on a regional basis, so that a given community would have apart-
ments, while an adjoining community would not. But as long
as we allow zoning to be done community by community, it is
intolerable to allow one municipality (or many municipalities) to
close its doors at the expense of surrounding communities and
the central city.14
The onslaught against exclusionary zoning has not been limited
to the courts of Pennsylvania. In Union City, California, SASSO, a
non-profit corporation, together with individual, low-income Mexican-
American citizens, filed a suit against the city and its officials to com-
pel them to take all steps necessary, including multi-family dwelling
rezoning, to permit the building of a federal low and moderate-in-
come housing project.15 The Union City Council had adopted a
rezoning ordinance providing for a variance permitting multi-family
10. Id. at 324.
11. - Pa. -, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
12. Id. at -, 268 A.2d at 769.
13. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
14. Id. at - n. 4, 263 A.2d at 399 n. 4 (emphasis by the court).
15. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organization v. City of Union City,
424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
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residential use. However, the voters rejected the council's ordinance
through a referendum. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found that the referendum did not result in discrimination. Never-
theless, the court reasoned:
[fIt may well be, as a matter of law, that it is the responsibility
of a city and its planning officials to see that the city's plan as
initiated or as it develops accommodates the needs of its low in-
come families, who usually-if not always-are members of minor-
ity groups.18
Even in the absence of a finding of racial discrimination, the city was
ordered to attempt to fill its low-income housing needs by May 1,
1970, and to submit to the court every three months a report on steps
taken to fulfill this need.
The most recent stage in the battle against exclusionary zoning
took place in the courts of New Jersey. The New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled that public housing constitutes grounds for a special
variance. In De Simone v. Greater Englewood Housing Corporation
No. 1,17 the court held that the establishment of public or semi-public
housing accommodations designed to replace substandard living con-
ditions or to furnish housing for minority or under-privileged seg-
ments of the population outside the ghetto area is a "special reason"
within the authorizing statute for granting a variance.
Where will the courts go after De Simone? What, in fact, will be
the legal strategy for the 70's?
Lawrence Sager s believes that a "new equal protection" doctrine
may emerge in the zoning field. Such a doctrine will have its basis
in cases like Griffin v. Illinois,9 in which the Supreme Court held that
an indigent defendant is entitled to a free transcript at the state's
expense, if such transcript is essential for appellate review of a crimi-
nal conviction. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections2o the doc-
trine introduced in Griffin was extended to the voting rights field.
While housing may not be considered an area on a par with criminal
justice or voting rights, the courts may well meet the problems posed
by exclusionary zoning by embracing a new concept of equal protec-
tion.
16. Id. at 295-96.
17. 267 A.2d 31 (1970).
18. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rav. 767 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Sager].
19. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
20. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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If the interest of the poor and lower-middle class to access to the
affluent islands is recognized as one of constitutional importance, it
can be argued that the poor, on a neighborhood, organizational, or
ombudsman basis should be provided with expert planning and ad-
vocative assistance. 21 Other solutions might well entail a legal strategy
based on the fourteenth amendment attacking not only zoning re-
strictions but standards established in building codes.
The question at this point is what weapons will be utilized.
21. Sager at 800.
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